

as revealed in the writings of such great poets as Kalidasa, more especially as such matters are brought into relief successively with reference to a long line of model monarchs in whose praise the immortal epic *Raghuvamsa* has itself been conceived. World Law is likely to receive a valuable original impetus when studied on the broad basis of a two-sided or dialectical interaction between the *General Good* and the *Good of All*, especially in India where holy tradition seems already to be in favour of such an approach. Rousseau's name, supplementing such a view from the Western world, would be sure to give it additional confirmation and support, even in the light of the most modern political theories. World Law thus becomes one that is unwritten, as well as being easily given to a common sense of justice in human relations. It is thus in this double perspective that we invite the attention of students to this all-important subject.

Some Straight Thoughts On World Law

FREDDY VAN DER BORCHT

IS it possible for man to live in a state of nature, without any laws? If all laws were to be abolished in a certain country, would life be any the worse or freedom any the less? Freedom is also called liberty, which is the first and most important of the three words used in connection with the French Revolution—*Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite*. Mechanistically understood, freedom can only mean the condition in which human beings are allowed to behave in any manner they like, without any rules regulating their conduct. After the French Revolution, we know that there still survived laws from the time of Louis XIV. Liberty did not mean that laws were abolished altogether, which might have been normal to expect after the success of the revolution. We can thus see that liberty is a misleading word, and that it could be taken to mean the mere change from one set of laws to another, rather than the absence of law altogether.

The same may be said of equality and fraternity. We should have expected after the revolution that class differences would be abolished; but equality and fraternity did not abolish the difference between master and servant, capitalist and labourer. The change was only from the feudal set-up of the *ancien regime* to something slightly revised. And in both cases, people could be classified under one or other of the broad divisions into which humanity is divided, known as the "haves" and the "have-nots," who have always existed in this world and still exist even now. The very fight or revolution itself involves a violation of fraternity. In Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables*, the desperate students had to kill the soldiers with bullets that

the boy Gavroche stole from the bodies of soldiers already fallen, as he passed continuously from one side of the battle to the other until being himself finally killed. By violating fraternity on the battlefield, one is said to gain another fraternity. The incompatibility of ends and means is the objection here.

THE TWO SIDES INVOLVED

We see, then, that words like equality and fraternity can have no meaning at all when thought of unilaterally. Liberty must necessarily imply bondage, and can be understood only when bondage is also understood. A two-sided approach is thus involved when we consider World Law.

If we take the case of the human body as an example, we can say that not being able to bend our arms backwards, as we are able to bend them forwards, means a lack of freedom. Bondage is thus implied in the very way our bodies are built; on the one side there is freedom, and on the other side an equal lack of freedom. If this is true of the physical body, it must also be applicable to the body politic. We often hear of the reference to one's own country as one that enjoys freedom, but this does not mean that there are no restrictions at all on the behaviour of individuals. It is easy to attach labels or apply nick-names to one's own or another's country, according to one's favours or fears, but all such unilateral appraisals are to be rejected by a foregone conclusion as childish errors. The subject of World Law has necessarily to be viewed in a two-sided perspective.

We have to consider on the one side the lawgiver, and on the other those who benefit by the laws. World Law would then be seen to be the resultant of an interaction between these two dialectical counterparts—the agent who formulates or gives the laws to serve the cause of the happiness of the people, and the beneficiaries or people themselves who are supposed to obey the laws.

We have already said that it is only the outward form of government which changes after a revolution has taken place. The two

sides represented by the haves and the have-nots continue to exist after the revolution, and problems persist as before. All politics is an attempt to give to the haves and the have-nots something more. This division, persisting within the group of people which is to benefit from the law, is likely to cause conflict after a revolution as well as before it. The American War of Independence, the French Revolution and the Bolshevik October Revolution are milestones in the dialectical revaluation of the world of politics in modern history. We have also the two world wars which brought tangible readjustments to the overall set-up of relations between nations constituting a world community. Each of these wars brought into existence its own type of international institution. The 11th of November 1918 marked Armistice Day, the end of World War I, giving rise to the institution of the League of Nations. The League became defunct with the outbreak of World War II, and was replaced by a revised and renewed institution on a bolder scale known as the United Nations Organization, with all its ramified units for the peace and selective security of mankind. We know that even now the situation is not stable or secure, that the General Secretary is threatening to resign, and that the very existence of the organization is threatened both externally and internally. We thus travel haphazardly from one set of laws or rules to another in a self-perpetuating process that is endless. No real or lasting uniformity or peace will prevail among nations until one absolute law is recognized for the whole world.

LAW IS LIKE A GAME

When we consider law as it is to be applied to a group of people or even to humanity in general, we have, as we have said, to distinguish clearly the position of the lawgiver from that of the haves and the have-nots. These latter two contending parties could be compared to the two rival teams in a football game, while the lawgiver, on the other hand, could easily be compared to the umpire or referee. Here, an important relational attitude emerges to view. The umpire cannot kick the ball when it comes near to him, even by mistake.

Every schoolboy knows the rightness of this rule, but it is still difficult to say precisely why it should be so. Rousseau, in his *Contrat Social*, points out that the lawgiver should be "oceans removed" from those who are to benefit by the laws; in other words, the rules are for the benefit of the players generally, whether on one side or the other of the game, while the umpire should not be involved in either. There is hiding here a dialectical secret of the first order. The umpire or lawgiver is interested in the good of the totality of the players on both sides taken together, in terms of the general enjoyability of the game as a whole, and thus locates himself neutrally between the rival teams. Each member of each team, on the other hand, plays the game for gaining some advantage—not general, but personal. This kind of concern for particularized ends or individual benefit belongs to the context of what we could call the *Good of All*, while its dialectical counterpart as represented in the person of the umpire could be characterized by the term *General Good*.

In terms of structural analysis, we would place the two rival teams representing the *Good of All* on the horizontal axis—the have on one side and the have-nots on the other, facing each other in mutual contention—and enclose the whole situation in a circle so as to make one working unit out of it. On the vertical axis, cutting through the horizontal at right-angles to it, we could place another circle, higher up from the horizontal actualities of the game itself. This locus would represent the umpire in relation to the rival teams, as standing for the *General Good*. Thus, the *Good of All* belongs to what is horizontal in terms of the actual competition taking place on the field of play, while the *General Good* has a vertical reference with the referee placed on the numerator side, oceans removed from the actualities of the field, and deriving no particular benefit for himself either from the play itself or from the outcome of the game which he is responsible for regulating.

THE UNITIVE APPROACH

By the above analysis, employing the analogy of a football game, we are now able to see how World Law is to be conceived in its broad

outlines, and something at least of what must be the nature of the lawgiver. Such a lawgiver can have neither any axe to grind nor aims of selfish interest to serve through the process of the law that he himself indicates or puts into force. He must have, as Rousseau puts it in the *Contrat Social*, "a mind of the highest order." He must "have insight into each and every human passion, and yet be affected by none." He must "be superhuman, and yet understand human nature through and through." And he must have a mind which "would be willing to concern itself with our happiness, but would seek its own outside us." He must, in short, be concerned primarily with the *General Good*, while the beneficiaries of the law are interested in the *Good of All*. Any World Law must have these two sides.

This is the important point that we thus wish to underline, that World Law is an emergent factor, written or sometimes unwritten, in which the dialectical counterparts are recognizable to us in terms of what we have tried to distinguish as the *General Good* and the *Good of All*. These two sides could be represented more shortly by the words on the famous monument of the Swiss Confederation, *UN POUR TOUS* (One for all) and *TOUS POUR UN* (All for One), representing the contrasting parties which have entered by mutual consent into a confederation in which the *General Good* and the *Good of All* are secured together, without contradiction. Such an approach to World Law, based on these two dialectical counterparts, owes its existence, again, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Citoyen de Geneve*.

CONCLUSION

By way of concluding this brief and general treatment of World Law, we wish to point out that the same subtle dialectics involved herein can as well be applied as a basis of World Government, the two subjects being capable of unitive treatment under the more general heading of *geo-dialectics*. Whatever might be the number of unit states concerned, and whatever the nature of the individual differences between them, it is possible to bring them into a dialectical relation

by which the horizontal differences and the vertical resemblances could both be treated unitively. If such an arrangement works in Switzerland today, the possibility of its adaptability to World Government should be sufficiently clear to the thinking man. World Law needs to be viewed in a certain unitive perspective so that it could become a possibility in the context of one World Government in the name of one Absolute Justice for the whole of mankind.

IV. Yoga

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

NATARAJA GURU

YOGA is a subject that is attracting much attention the world over at present. There is perhaps as much interest in yoga as there is misunderstanding about it. In the West, it evokes such ideas as the "serpent power," sometimes referred to as the *kundalini*. In the world of drop-outs, it has become a subject of all-absorbing interest. Yoga institutes and teachers exist in great numbers round about big cities like London, Bruxelles, Paris, Toronto and New York, not to mention Los Angeles and San Francisco. British school-girls practice *pranayama*, and understand all about *asanas* and *bandhas*; they can bend their vertebral columns in many difficult twists without snapping them. Myriad schools teach different types of yoga which they claim belong to various grades ranging from *Hatha Yoga* to *Raja Yoga*. The varieties are infinite as also the textbooks and the experts, all over the Western world today. A multitude of varied spiritual powers and medical effects are claimed in the name of yoga.

Hiding behind this sensational seven-day wonder which is now the prevailing rage in the name of this ancient Indian discipline, there is another more sober and less sensational yogic tradition which knowers of yoga in India would like very much to see properly understood, so that such knowledge might act as a corrective to the exag-